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This study complements the extant literature by assessing how enhancing supply factors of 
mobile technologies affect mobile money innovations for financial inclusion in developing 
countries. The mobile money innovation outcome variables are: mobile money accounts, the 
mobile phone used to send money and the mobile phone used to receive money. The mobile 
technology supply factors are: unique mobile subscription rate, mobile connectivity 
performance, mobile connectivity coverage and telecommunications (telecom) sector 
regulation. The empirical evidence is based on quadratic Tobit regressions and the following 
findings are established. There are Kuznets or inverted shaped nexuses between three of the 
four supply factors and mobile money innovations from which thresholds for complementary 
policies are provided as follows: (i) Unique adults’ mobile subscription rates of 128.500%, 
121.500% and 77.750% for mobile money accounts, the mobile used to send money and the 
mobile used to receive money, respectively; (ii) the average share of the population covered 
by 2G, 3G and 4G mobile data networks of 61.250% and 51.833% for the mobile used to send 
money and the mobile used to receive money, respectively; and (iii) a telecom sector 
regulation index of  0.409, 0.283 and 0.283 for mobile money accounts, the mobile phone 
used to send money and the mobile phone used to receive money, respectively. Some 
complementary policies are discussed, because at the attendant thresholds, the engaged supply 
factors of mobile money technologies become necessary, but not sufficient conditions of 
mobile money innovations for financial inclusion.  
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There are three main motivational factors that justify the focus of this study on 
understanding how supply factors of mobile money innovation affect financial inclusion in 
developing countries, notably: (i) the growing potential of mobile phones in development 
outcomes in developing countries; (ii) the importance of financial inclusion in the post-2015 
development agenda, with specific relevance to poverty-oriented and inequality-related 
sustainable development goals (SDGs); and (iii) gaps in the attendant mobile money 
innovations for financial inclusion literature. These three factors are put in more perspective 
in the subsequent paragraphs in the same chronology, as highlighted. 
First, over the past decade, the use of mobile phones has grown considerably in 
developing countries, increasing possibilities for socio-economic and human developments 
because of, inter alia, associated positive development externalities pertaining to mobile 
money usage, adoption and innovation (Sy, 2019). Relative to developed countries, which 
have almost reached points of saturation in the penetration of mobile technologies, developing 
countries are characterised by a higher potential for mobile phone penetration and by 
extension, the inclusive development and socio-economic opportunities associated with the 
attendant higher prospect of penetration (Gosavi, 2018; Tchamyou, Asongu, Odhiambo, 
2019). One of the advantages of mobile phone innovation that facilitates inclusive socio-
economic development is financial inclusion1.   
 Secondly, mobile money is a financial inclusion service that is provided by mobile 
phones. Whereas access to traditional banking services is not always possible due to a number 
of inhibiting factors that are inherent to traditional banking services, the fact that mobile 
phones are almost available to everybody in developing countries has enabled hundreds of 
millions of people to benefit from mobile banking services (Sy, 2019; Asongu, Biekpe & 
Cassimon, 2020, 2021). According to the narrative, mobile accounts which are now above 
bank accounts in numerical value have equally surpassed traditional bank accounts in 
providing financial inclusion because large swathes of the previously unbanked, the youth, the 
poor, the old, and women are now benefiting from mobile banking innovations (Klapper, El-
Zoghbi & Hess, 2016; Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2018a, 2018b). To put this point into greater 
perspective, according to Sy (2019), in Africa and Asia, respectively, 10% and 7% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) of transactions are made via mobile money because most citizens in 
                                                             
1 “Mobile” and “mobile phone” are used interchangeably throughout the study. “Mobile money” and “mobile 
money innovations” are also used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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developing countries (compared to other regions where just about 2% of GDP transactions are 
linked to mobile money operations) are growingly taking advantage of services offered by 
mobile money to send/receive money nationally and internationally, as well as leverage on 
mobile money services to, inter alia, pay for goods and services, receive wages and pay bills 
(Sy, 2019; Tchamyou, Erregers & Cassimon, 2019). In light of these attendant advantages, 
mobile money-oriented externalities have been documented to represent an opportunity for 
developing countries to reach some poverty- and inequality-oriented SDGs. In this light, 
assessing supply factors that drive mobile money innovations is both scholarly-worthwhile 
and policy-relevant, especially given that such a focus fills the existing gap in the extant 
scholarship on financial inclusion.  
 Thirdly, the closest research to this study in the literature is Lashitew, van Tulder and 
Liasse (2019), in which the determinants of mobile money innovations in developing 
countries are investigated. To improve the extant literature, in this study, it is argued that 
simply providing nexuses between determinants of financial inclusion and financial inclusion 
is not enough because of policy concerns surrounding the perspective that some drivers of 
financial inclusion may not be yielding the expected effects on financial inclusion in 
developing countries (Klapper et al., 2016). Such concerns may arise from the fact that the 
nexuses between drivers of financial inclusion and mobile money innovations are not linear, 
as presented and estimated by Lashitew et al. (2019). This study argues that the nexuses could 
be non-linear such that specific critical masses or thresholds of the underlying drivers 
determine whether complementary policy mechanisms are needed for the attendant drivers of 
financial inclusion to have the expected effects on mobile money innovations. Therefore, this 
research argues that supply factors, such as mobile phone connectivity coverage, mobile 
connectivity performance, telecommunications sector regulation and unique mobile 
subscription rate, are not simply linear determinants of mobile money innovations for 
financial inclusion. By extension, it is also argued that policy makers should be provided with 
actionable turning points for complementary policies. It follows that the research question 
being examined by the present research is the following: At what thresholds should supply-
oriented drivers of mobile money innovation policies be supported with complementary 
policies in order to have the anticipated relationships with mobile money innovations that 
favour financial inclusion? 
 In order to provide an answer to the above question, this study employs the same 
dataset and estimation technique (i.e. Tobit regressions) as in the study closest to it (i.e.  
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Lashitew et al., 2019). Thus, by focusing on interactive regressions instead of understanding 
drivers of mobile money innovations within the framework of linear additive modeling (i.e. as 
in Lashitew et al., 2019), this study shows that at certain critical masses of mobile money 
supply factors, governments of sampled countries should take on board complementary 
policies in order for the engaged supply factors to favorably affect mobile money innovations 
for financial inclusion. These established thresholds for complementary policies are as 
follows: (i) Unique adults’ mobile subscription rates of 128.500%, 121.500% and 77.750% 
for mobile money accounts, the mobile used to send money and the mobile used to receive 
money, respectively; (ii) the average share of the population covered by 2G, 3G and 4G 
mobile data networks of 61.250% and 51.833% for the mobile used to send money and the 
mobile used to receive money, respectively; and (iii) a telecom sector regulation index of 
0.409, 0.283 and 0.283 for mobile money accounts, the mobile phone used to send money and 
the mobile phone used to receive money, respectively. 
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2, insights are provided into 
the theoretical underpinnings, while the data and methodology are presented in Section 3. The 
empirical results are disclosed and discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the study is concluded 
with policy implications and future research directions.  
  
2. Theoretical underpinnings  
It is important to clarify upfront the distinction between mobile banking and mobile money. 
Accordingly, in the study, the outcome variables are mobile money innovations which entail 
aspects of mobile banking such as mobile money accounts, the mobile phone used to send 
money and the mobile phone used to receive money (Firpo, 2009; Lashitew et al., 2019). The 
theoretical framework underlying the nexuses being examined in the present study can be 
articulated in three principal strands: (i) how bank accounts and mobile money innovation are 
connected; (ii) the free market model and (iii) the information asymmetry theory (Asongu, 
2020). It is important to note that the first strand is consistent with the unique mobile 
subscription rate, mobile connectivity performance and mobile connectivity coverage; the 
second strand is in line with telecommunications (hence telecom) sector regulation while the 
third strand is consistent with all the four mobile money innovation supply factors considered 
for the study (i.e. unique mobile subscription rate, mobile connectivity coverage, mobile 
connectivity performance and telecom sector regulation). These strands are elucidated in the 
passages below in the same chronology as highlighted. 
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 First, the linkages between mobile money innovations and bank accounts which have 
been documented by Asongu (2013) and Ondiege (2013) provide the fundamentals that 
underpin the use of mobile phones in mobile banking, in light of the fact that this study is 
concerned with mobile money innovations associated with mobile phones. In essence, the 
notion of mobile banking as considered in the theoretical literature is in accordance with the 
understanding of innovations in mobile money used in this study, namely: mobile money 
accounts, the mobile used to send money and the mobile used to receive money. In light of the 
corresponding literature, four perspectives on the nexus between mobile money innovations 
and mobile phones can be emphasized. (i) The mobile denotes a virtual bank card via which 
bank clients and institutions can build upon to mitigate bank costs pertaining to the manner in 
which traditional bank cards are managed and distributed. Accordingly, given that the mobile 
is characterised by a subscriber identity module (SIM), such a mobile, reflects a smartcard 
that can be performant in usage as the virtual bank card. (ii) The point of sale (POS) function 
is also consistent with the mobile in light of the fact that the mobile phone provides a means 
of communicating and transacting with banks by providing the latter with complementary 
channels in the authorization and solicitation of transactions. It is worthwhile to also note that 
some functionalities pertaining to the traditional bank account can be taken on board with the 
mobile as it acts as a POS terminal. (iii) The characteristics of the automated teller machine 
(ATM) are also inherent within the mobile especially in light of the fact that the POS features 
attributed to mobile phones can be used for the payment and receipt of bills, which is 
consistent with the mobile money adoption proxies used in the present study. (iv) When a 
mobile phone is equipped with the internet, it also plays the function of an internet banking 
terminal given that it enables the user to inter alia, easily and instantly have access to a bank 
account and make payments.  
 Second, Pradeep (2011) has documented a free-market model which can be used to 
substantiate the framework of the present study in light of the fact that the model is based on 
financial exclusion as a consequence of lack of government regulation while the present study 
uses telecommunications sector regulation as a driver of financial inclusion within the 
framework of mobile money innovations. Consistent with the free market model, unchecked 
banking sector deregulation may not only exacerbate concerns about financial exclusion, but 
also lead to issues in the financial spaces of countries. As argued by Pradeep (2011), there are 
two main potential avenues that can be the consequence of excessive lack of regulation. One 
can be an unregulated financial system that fosters existing polarization in society between the 
financially-included and the financially-excluded. The other entails, the number of groups that 
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are excluded in society and under circumstances whereby such exclusion is enhanced by more 
deregulation. Telecom sector regulation which elucidates the degree of deregulation in the 
telecom sector determines dynamics of competition and market power (or bank concentration) 
that influence whether more financial access is made possible through mobile money 
innovations or if banks leverage on their market power to improve their margins of profit 
instead of fulfilling one of their fundamental missions of enhancing financial access in 
society.  
 Third, the information asymmetry theory is a fundamental determinant of financial 
inclusion or financial access because it is associated with concerns of adverse selection (i.e. 
ex-ante of the process of borrowing) and moral hazard (i.e. ex-post of the borrowing process). 
Accordingly, the attendant information asymmetry limits financial access because the lack of 
sufficient information on the credit history of clients can motivate the bank to increase 
associated bank charges and interests in order to hedge against the attendant risks (Asongu & 
Biekpe, 2018). Connecting the theory to the framework of this study, it is argued that 
information asymmetry concerns can also influence how a client benefits from mobile 
banking services through the use of a mobile phone that is connected to a formal bank 
account. In essence, mobile money innovations are not exclusively limited to the informal 
sector because most banks are now offering options of managing formal bank accounts with a 
money phone and the externalities of mobile money innovations characterizing mobile 
banking in the non-formal financial sector are also offered by such mobile banking services 
associated with the formal banking sector. It is essentially for the purpose of avoiding 
information asymmetry that information sharing offices in the perspectives of private credit 
bureaus and public credit registries are being increasingly instituted in developing countries 
(Kusi, Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu & Gyeke-Dako, 2017; Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi & 
Tchamyou, 2018; Kusi & Opoku‐Mensah, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a). It follows that 
concerns underlying information asymmetry can influence: (i) the number of bank clients that 
are offered wide ranging mobile banking services that engender more financial access; (ii) 
what connectivity networks in terms of coverage and performance are adopted by banks 
which may endow customers with connectivity depending on their credit histories and (iii) the 
telecommunications sector regulation can be used to avoid credit risks related to financial 
access. The underlying three points capture the supply factors of mobile money innovations 





3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
 Consistent with the problem statement being envisaged in the present study, the 
dataset is in line with that used by the closest studies to this research (Lashitew et al., 2019; 
Asongu et al., 2020, 2021)2. These attendant sources as articulated in Appendix 1 (i.e.which 
informs the study on the definitions of variables and corresponding sources) include: (i) the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank; (ii) the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank; (iii) Waverman and Koutroumpis(2011); (iv) the Global 
System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA); (v) the Financial Inclusion Indices 
(Findex) database and (vi) the Global Financial Structure Database (GFSD). Hence, consistent 
with Lashitew et al. (2019) and  Asongu, Agyemang-Mintah and Nting (2021), the 
corresponding data entail averages from 2010 to 2014 and involve all developing countries for 
which data was available at the time of the study.  
 The adopted mobile money innovations that are in line with the corresponding mobile 
money inclusion literature are sourced from the Findex database and include: mobile money 
accounts, the mobile used to send money and the mobile used to receive money (Lashitew et 
al., 2019; Asongu et al., 2020, 2021). Three main categories are used for the independent 
variables of interest and control variables, namely: macro-related, supply and demand factors. 
Consistent with the problem statement in the previous sections, this study adopts supply 
factors as the independent variables while the macro-level and demand factors are 
acknowledged and used as the corresponding control variables.  
 First, adopted supply variables which are informed by the underlying literature are: (i) 
telecommunications sector regulation (hence telecom regulation) from Waverman and 
Koutroumpis (2011); (ii)“gross and unique subscription” rates from the GSMA; (iii) mobile 
penetration rate from the WDI and (iv) dynamics of mobile connectivity (i.e. mobile 
connectivity coverage and mobile connectivity performance) from the GSMA. Second, the 
corresponding demand factors which are from the GFSD are: “percentage of adults with a 
bank account in a formal banking institution”; the number of automated teller machines 
(ATMs) and bank sector concentration. Third, the adopted macro-levels variables are from 
WDI (i.e.urbanization rate, GDP growth and GDP per capita) and WGI (i.e. the rule of law) of 
the World Bank. It is also worthwhile to articulate that, the above control variables are for the 
                                                             
2The study focuses on developing countries because this is the dataset used by Lashitew et al. (2019) (i.e. the 
study that is being extended) is based on developing countries. In the regression analysis, regional dummies are 
employed for control for specific regions of developing countries in order not to render “developing countries” 
all encompassing.  
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most part, with the exception of bank concentration or market power, expected to boost 
mobile money innovation,. The choice of attendant control variables is largely informed by 
the relevant literature on financial inclusion (Mas & Morawczynski, 2009; Waverman & 
Koutroumpis, 2011; Muwanguzi & Musambira, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013;  Gruber & Koutroumpis, 2013; Van der Boor, Oliveira & 
Veloso, 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper & Van Oudheusden, 2015; World Bank, 2016; 
Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Asongu & Asongu, 2018; 
Murendo, Wollni, De Brauw & Mugabi, 2018; GSMA, 2018; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020, 2021). 
In essence, bank sector concentration is  a proxy for market power in the banking industry (De 
Guevara, Maudos & Pérez, 2005;  Ryan, O’Toole & McCann, 2014) and has been 
documented to limit financial access in developing countries (Asongu, Nwachukwu & 
Tchamyou, 2016; Asongu & Biekpe, 2018). 
 Appendix 1 discloses the sources and corresponding definitions of the adopted 
variables while Appendix 2 focuses on the summary statistics. The correlation matrix is 
provided in Appendix 3 in which, the concerns about multicollinearity in light of a threshold 
of 0.600 are highlighted in bold. The choice of the multicollinearity threshold and how it 
informs the selection of variables used in the specifications is further elicited in the last 
paragraph of the methodology section.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The empirical strategy adopted by this study is consistent with contemporary literature on 
mobile money innovations that have adopted similar outcome variables (Lashitew et al., 2019; 
Asongu, 2020). Accordingly, this attendant literature is on the same wavelength with other 
strands of economic development literature that have not focused on the mobile money 
innovations as the outcome variable (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; Koetter & Vins, 2008; 
Ariss, 2010; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; Ajide, Raheem & 
Asongu, 2019). A common denominator of both strands of research is the position that the 
Tobit estimation strategy is worthwhile when the dependent variable is captured within the 
specified minimum and maximum limits. 
 To put the above narrative into perspective, it is imperative to link the underpinnings 
to the behavior of the adopted outcome variables in this study. Accordingly, the adopted 
mobile money innovation variables are practically and theoretically situated between 0% and 
100% adoption rate. In essence, as shown in Appendix 2, these variables are defined within 
the highlighted range, notably: mobile money account ranges from 0.00% to 58.39%, the 
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mobile phone used to send money varies from 0.00% to 60.48% and the mobile phone used to 
receive money ranges from 0.00% to 66.65%. It follows that these adopted outcome variables 
are censored within the range of 0.00% to 100% with the former (latter) being the minimum 
(maximum) possible value. Given that these attendant variables are censored both in the left-
hand and in the right-hand sides, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique is not tailored to 
take on board variations in the conditional probabilities of limited observations as may be 
apparent in countries that reflect 100% adoption rate or 0% adoption rate (Amemiya, 1984). 
In light of this clarification, it follows that the Tobit regression strategy adopted for this study 
is consistent with the behavior of the outcome variables because it can censore both sides of 
the conditional distribution of the corresponding dependent variables. Hence, the double 
censored Tobit model is used to assess the problem statement of the present study, notably: 
how enhancing supply factors of mobile money innovations influence financial inclusion and 
by extension, what corresponding thresholds are relevant for complementary policies. 
 In light of seminal research pertaining to Tobit estimations (Tobin, 1958; Carson & 
Sun, 2007), Equations (1) and (2) below reflect the main Tobit estimation process.  
,                                                 (1) 
where is a latent response variable, is an observed vector of explanatory variables 
and i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is independent of . As opposed to observing , we observe
:   
                                                     (2) 
where is a non-stochastic constant. It follows that, the value of is missing when it is less 
than or equal to . 
 It is also relevant to note that, the following underpinnings are consistent with the 
Tobit approach: (i) residuals pertaining to the regression strategy are distributed normally and 
(ii) evidence is apparent of latent dependent variables that are characterised by an unbounded 
and a linear function of the independent variables of interest (Amemiya, 1984). Moreover, 
there are two main marginal nexuses linked with the attendant independent variables of 
interest (i.e. unique mobile subscription rate, mobile connectivity performance, mobile 
connectivity coverage and telecommunications sector regulation). The first reflects the 
marginal nexus of the independent variables of the unobserved latent mobile money adoption 
rate whereas the other reflects the observed and censored rate of mobile money adoption. In 
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(Lashitew et al., 2019; Asongu et al., 2020, 2021), only marginal nexuses related to the 
censored and observed mobile money innovation adopted rates are provided because in 
accordance with  the attendant literature, the disclosure of these marginal nexuses provide a 
more worthwhile analytical interpretation.  
 Before presenting the empirical results, it is also important to note that, the 
specifications are tailored to address concerns of multicollinearity that were not taken on 
board by Lashitew et al. (2019), though addressed by subsequent replication research that has 
built on the same dataset (Asongu et al., 2020, 2021). Following the related studies, a 
threshold of 0.600 is retained as the critical point used to determine potential concerns of 
multicollinearity. 0.600 is the average of thresholds from the two contending strands in the 
multicollinearity literature. Accordingly, Obrien (2007) and Wichers (1975) have posited a 
0.500 threshold whereas Kennedy (2008) has argued for a 0.700 threshold. Hence, the 
retained 0.600 is the average of the two contending thresholds. The corresponding concerns of 
multicollinearity are highlighted in bold in Appendix 3. It follows that owing to the identified 
concerns of multicollinearity, in the present study, some combinations of variables, as entered 
into the same specification in Lashitew et al. (2019), are avoided in the same specifications of 
this study in light of more contemporary literature that has addressed the concern of 
multicollinearity (Asongu et al., 2020, 2021). Hence, some variables from Lashitew et al. 
(2019) are not included in the specifications of this study, inter alia: the percentage of adults 
who have an account at a formal financial institution, GDP per capita and the rule of law.  
 
4. Empirical results   
4.1 Presentation of results 
 The empirical results disclosed in this section are tailored to answer the concern motivating 
this study, notably, how enhancing each of the four supply factors underlined in Lashitew et 
al. (2019) affects mobile money innovations. The attendant findings in Tables 1-2 are 
provided in four main categories with each table emphasizing two main categories. Table 1 
focuses on unique mobile subscription rates and mobile connectivity performance while Table 
2 is concerned with mobile connectivity coverage and telecom sector regulation. In either 
table, each category corresponding to a supply factor entails three main specifications 
pertaining to each of the mobile money innovation proxies, namely: mobile money accounts, 
mobile used to send money and mobile used to receive money. 
 In order to assess the overall incidence of enhancing the supply factors on the 
corresponding mobile money innovations, net relationships are computed in accordance with 
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contemporary literature on interactive (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020a, 2020b; Agoba, Abor, 
Osei & Sa-Aadu, 2019) and quadratic (Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020c, 
2020d) regressions. To put the computation of the corresponding net relationship into greater 
perspective, let us consider the second column (i.e. first specification) of Table 1 in which the 
net relationship of enhancing the unique mobile subscription rate on mobile money accounts 
is 0.133 (2×[-0.001 × 61.78] + [0.257]). In this calculation, 0.257 is the unconditional 
relationship between unique mobile subscription rate and financial inclusion (i.e. mobile 
money accounts), 61.78 is the average value of unique mobile subscription, -0.001 is the 
conditional or marginal relationship of unique mobile subscription while the leading 2 
corresponds to the quadratic derivation. Following the same computational framework: (i) 
positive net relationships are apparent from enhancing the unique mobile subscription rate for 
financial inclusion; (ii) net relationships cannot be computed in regressions pertaining to 
mobile connectivity performance because at least one estimated coefficient needed for their 
computation in respective specifications is not significant; (iii) negative net relationships are 
apparent from enhancing mobile connectivity coverage and (iv) the enhancement of telecom 
sector regulation also engenders net negative nexuses. Most of the significant control 
variables display the anticipated signs, inter alia, the negative relationship from bank 
concentration or market power in influencing financial inclusion by means of mobile money 
innovations and the leading role of Africa in driving mobile money innovations, compared to 

















Table 1: Mobile subscription, mobile connectivity performance and financial inclusion  
       
 Dependent variables: Mobile money accounts, Mobile used to send money & 
Mobile used to receive money 
       
 Unique Mobile Subscription Mobile Connectivity Performance 






















       
Supply   Factors        
Unique Mobile Subscription (UMS) 0.257*** 0.243** 0.311** --- --- --- 
 (0.005) (0.024) (0.020)    
UMS×UMS -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002** --- --- --- 
 (0.007) (0.034) (0.024)    
Mobile Connectivity Performance (MCP) --- --- --- -0.001 -0.057 -0.056 
    (0.988) (0.617) (0.666) 
MCP×MCP --- --- --- 0.0004 -0.004 -0.006* 
    (0.803) (0.103) (0.060) 
Control variables        
Demand Factors        
ATM penetration -0.010 -0.044** -0.056** -0.019 -0.020 -0.030 
 (0.250) (0.024) (0.015) (0.133) (0.253) (0.159) 
Banking sector concentration -0.047** -0.036* -0.050** -0.054** -0.028 -0.038 
 (0.021) (0.069) (0.037) (0.018) (0.207) (0.143) 
       
Macro-level factors        
GDP growth  0.550*** 0.161 0.111 0.428** 0.067 -0.009 
 (0.001) (0.423) (0.668) (0.029) (0.741) (0.972) 
Urbanization  -0.044* -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 0.019 0.033 
 (0.094) (0.570) (0.671) (0.470) (0.648) (0.521) 
       
Region dummies        
Africa 8.052*** 3.998** 5.665** 8.170*** 2.475 3.776* 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.012) (0.000) (0.153) (0.074) 
Asia 3.018* -0.358 0.248 3.449* -0.329 0.273 
 (0.056) (0.778) (0.874) (0.060) (0.834) (0.885) 
Americas  5.346*** 0.011 0.572 5.612*** -1.859 -1.899 
 (0.001) (0.991) (0.637) (0.003) (0.200) (0.236) 
Middle East  6.002*** -0.313 0.736 5.554*** -1.939 -1.327 
 (0.002) (0.843) (0.669) (0.006) (0.289) (0.489) 
       
Net Relationship 0.133 0.119 0.063 na na na 
Thresholds  128.500 121.500 77.750 na na na 
Observations  132 134 134 129 131 131 
       
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The average 
value of unique mobile subscription rate is 61.78. The average value of mobile connectivity performance is 11.92..na: not applicable because 





















Table 2: Mobile connectivity coverage, telecom sector regulation and financial inclusion  
       
 Dependent variables: Mobile money accounts, Mobile used to send money & 
Mobile used to receive money 
       
 Mobile Connectivity Coverage Telecom Sector Regulation 





















       
Supply   Factors        
Mobile Connectivity Coverage (MCC) 0.088 0.245*** 0.311*** --- --- --- 
 (0.232) (0.005) (0.003)    
MCC×MCC -0.0005 -0.002*** -0.003*** --- --- --- 
 (0.361) (0.001) (0.000)    
Telecom Sector Regulation (TSR) --- --- --- 20.605** 26.164** 31.155** 
    (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) 
TSR×TSR --- --- --- -25.146* -46.168** -54.886*** 
    (0.070) (0.011) (0.007) 
Control variables        
Demand Factors        
ATM penetration -0.018 -0.029* -0.042** -0.010 -0.037* -0.047** 
 (0.100) (0.091) (0.049) (0.311) (0.061) (0.049) 
Banking sector concentration -0.051** -0.032 -0.045* -0.049 -0.031 -0.046* 
 (0.017) (0.123) (0.070) (0.038) (0.179) (0.094) 
       
Macro-level factors        
GDP growth  0.423** 0.131 0.071 0.677*** 0.171 0.075 
 (0.030) (0.526) (0.795) (0.000) (0.486) (0.811) 
Urbanization  -0.023 0.010 0.018 -0.033 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.393) (0.811) (0.739) (0.191) (0.914) (0.979) 
       
Region dummies        
Africa 8.721*** 2.495 4.102* 7.309*** 2.254 3.984* 
 (0.000) (0.130) (0.051) (0.000) (0.174) (0.067) 
Asia 3.724** -1.198 -0.693 2.980* -1.505 -1.017 
 (0.036) (0.408) (0.684) (0.083) (0.307) (0.561) 
Americas  5.495*** -1.670 -1.386 4.582*** -1.181 -0.597 
 (0.001) (0.201) (0.348) (0.005) (0.354) (0.694) 
Middle East  5.558*** -2.150 -1.182 5.928*** -1.339 0.451 
 (0.006) (0.224) (0.514) (0.006) (0.528) (0.851) 
       
Net relationship na -0.0037 -0.0620 -0.0147 -11.693 -13.851 
Thresholds  na 61.250 51.833 0.409 0.283 0.283 
Observations  129 131 131 112 116 116 
       
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. The average value of mobile connectivity coverage is 62.18. The average value of telecom regulation is  0.41. 
na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net relationshipis not significant.  
 
4.2 Extended analysis with thresholds for complementary policies  
 Despite different tendencies in net relationships as apparent in Tables 1-2, a common 
denominator in the quadratic nexuses is that in regressions for which net relationships are 
computed, the unconditional relationships are consistently positive while the corresponding 
marginal or conditional relationships are also consistently negative. This implies that a 
Kuznets or inverted U shape nexus is consistently apparent. It also translates the perspective 
that at a critical mass of the supply factors, the positive unconditional relationship is 
completely nullified owing to an increasing negative marginal relationship. At the 
corresponding thresholds or turning points, complementary policies are relevant in order to 
maintain the unconditional positive relationship between supply factors and financial 
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inclusion. In other words, promoting the supply factors is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for mobile money innovation once the attendant supply factors have been enhanced 
to a critical mass or specific threshold. 
   To put the above notion of threshold into more perspective, let us consider the same 
example used in the previous section, notably, the first specification or second column of 
Table 1. Hence, from the example, the corresponding threshold is 128.500 = 0.257/ (2×0.001). 
It follows that at a 128.500 unique mobile subscription rate (or 128.500 % of adults 
subscribing to mobile phone), the unconditional positive incidence of unique mobile 
subscription on mobile money accounts is completely nullified or crowded-out. Using the 
same framework of computation, complementary policies are needed at the following 
thresholds in order to maintain the positive unconditional relationship between supply factors 
and mobile money innovations: (i) Unique adults’ mobile subscription rates of 128.500%, 
121.500%  and 77.750% for respectively, mobile money accounts, the mobile used to send 
money and the mobile used to receive money; (ii) the average share of the population covered 
by 2G, 3G and 4G mobile data networks of 61.250% and 51.833% for the mobile used to send 
money and the mobile used to receive money, respectively; and (iii) a telecom sector 
regulation index of 0.409, 0.283 and 0.283 for respectively, mobile money accounts, the 
mobile phone used to send money and the mobile phone used to receive money. The 
computation of thresholds is consistent with contemporary literature related to interactive 
(Asongu, le Roux & Tchamyou, 2019) and quadratic (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020c) 
regressions literature.  
 For the established policy thresholds above to make economic sense and be relevant to 
policy makers, they should be situated within the statistical limits imposed by the summary 
statistics. After comparing the thresholds with the corresponding maximum and minimum 
limits imposed by the summary statistics, it is apparent that the attendant thresholds make 
economic sense and are relevant to policy makers. Accordingly, the established thresholds for 
unique mobile subscription rate, mobile connectivity coverage and telecom regulation are 
respectively between “4.23 and 133.64”, “8.88 and 99.60” and “0.00 and 0.74” units of the 
supply factors disclosed in the summary statistics. 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
This study has complemented the extant literature by assessing how enhancing supply 
factors of mobile technologies affect mobile money innovations for financial inclusion in 
16 
 
developing countries. The mobile money innovation outcome variables are mobile money 
accounts, the mobile phone used to send money and the mobile phone used to receive money. 
The mobile technology supply factors are unique mobile subscription rate, mobile 
connectivity performance, mobile connectivity coverage and telecommunications (telecom) 
sector regulation. The empirical evidence is based on quadratic Tobit regressions. The 
following findings are established.  
The following overall net nexuses are obtained from the findings: (i) Positive net 
relationships are apparent from enhancing the unique mobile subscription rate for financial 
inclusion; (ii) net relationships cannot be computed in regressions pertaining to mobile 
connectivity; (iii) negative net relationships are apparent from enhancing mobile connectivity 
coverage; and (iv) the enhancement of telecom sector regulation also engenders net negative 
nexuses. 
The Kuznets or inverted U-shaped nexuses that are significant in three of the four 
supply factors have motivated an extended analysis to establish supply factor thresholds for 
complementary policies which are as follows: (i) Unique adults’ mobile subscription rates of 
128.500 %, 121.500 % and 77.750 % for mobile money accounts, the mobile used to send 
money and the mobile used to receive money, respectively; (ii) the average share of the 
population covered by 2G, 3G and 4G mobile data networks of 61.250% and 51.833% for the 
mobile used to send money and the mobile used to receive money, respectively; and (iii) a 
telecom sector regulation index of 0.409, 0.283 and 0.283 for mobile money accounts, the 
mobile phone used to send money and the mobile phone used to receive money, respectively. 
The computed thresholds for complementary policies make economic sense and are policy-
relevant because they are within the statistical ranges disclosed in the summary statistics. 
Moreover, at the attendant thresholds, the engaged mobile technology supply factors become 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions in mobile phone innovations for financial inclusion. 
Hence, at the established thresholds, complementary policies should be taken on board.   
Some of the complementary policies could be tailored along the lines of, inter alia, (i) 
moving up the value chain of the financial services; (ii) engaging in more digital inclusion and 
innovation; and (iii) considering financial technologies (i.e. fintechs) beyond financial 
services (Sy, 2019). First, moving up the value chain of financial services may improve the 
importance of the supply factors at the established thresholds because it allows for 
innovations in terms of opening up savings accounts, taking up loans, purchasing insurance, 
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investing in the securities of government and borrowing electricity with mobile phone 
applications. Secondly, greater digital innovation and inclusion are also worthwhile, 
especially when at the established critical masses, and transitions from fintech services to the 
digital economy can be accelerated. In this view, such digital economic innovations are likely 
to spur economic prosperity that is accompanied by jobs and other positive development 
externalities. For these to materialize, the right policies that provide the relevant infrastructure 
(inter alia, electricity and the Internet) and a good regulatory framework that adapts with 
changes to mobile money innovations, are worthwhile. Thirdly, fintech related to mobile 
money innovations should go beyond financial services such that entrepreneurs and policy 
makers should consider fintechs beyond the more restricted scope of financial services. 
Accordingly, engaging untapped resources and increasing productivity, inter alia, can 
engender economic prosperity and structural transformation that require the use of mobile 
money services for more economic activities.  
 The findings in this study obviously leave room for future research regarding how 
complementary policies can be taken on board by policy makers when supply factors of 
mobile money innovations have reached certain thresholds. Moreover, as more data become 
available, reconsidering the established nexuses within causal empirical frameworks is 
worthwhile in order to inform policy makers about findings that are not robust exclusively 
from the perspective of relationships, but which can also be extended to causalities.  
 It is also relevant to point out that this study is an extension of Lashitew et al. (2019); 
hence, the dataset shared by the authors of the study being extended has only telecom 
regulation as a proxy for regulatory framework. This has a number of shortcomings which 
should be considered in future research. For instance, the regulatory framework governing 
mobile money is broader than telecom regulation, because, inter alia, payments regulation 
and law, as well as electronic money regulation (which are largely issued by Central Banks) 
articulate some principal requirements that are applicable to mobile money and associated 
innovations. Moreover, in considering the dynamics of competition and market power, as 
discussed in Section 2, telecom sector regulation, as well as cross-sectoral competition 
regulation/law has some relevance. Hence, in light of these caveats, telecom sector regulation 






Ethical approval and consent to participate: This article does not contain any studies with 
human participants or animals performed by the authors.  
Consent to Publish: Not applicable. 
Funding: This is an unfunded paper. 
Competing interest: The authors have neither financial nor non-financial competing 
interests. 
Availability of data and materials: the data for this paper is available upon request.  
Credit Author Statement 
 
Simplice  Asongu: Conceptualisation, Methodology, Software, Data curation, Writing-
Original Draft Preparation and Revision 
 
Nicholas Odhiambo: Revision and Proofreading 
 
Acknowledgement:  
The authors are thankful to Addisu A. Lashitew, Robvan Tulder and Yann Liasse, for sharing 















Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
   
Variables Descriptions  Sources 
   
   
Dependent variables   
   
Mobile Accounts Percentage of adults who have personally used mobile phone to pay bills, 
send or receive money in the past 12 months using a GSMA recognized 






Sending Money Percentage of adults who used a mobile phone to send money in the past 12 
months 
  
Receiving Money Percentage of adults who used a mobile phone to receive money in the past 
12 months 
   
   
Demand factors   
   
Account at formal 
financial 
institution 










The percentage share of the three largest commercial banks in total banking 
assets 
   
   
Supply factors   
   
Mobile phone 
penetration 
- Gross & unique 
subscription 
rates 
Gross mobile subscription rates refer to the percentage of adults in a 
country with subscriptions to 
mobile phones based on data from WDI. We used additional data from 
GSMA (2014) to calculate 
unique mobile subscription rates by correcting for double SIM-card 
ownership, which differs between 
rural and urban areas. This correction is based on survey evidence that 
urban and rural users own 





   
Mobile connectivity 
quality 
Measures the average speed of uploading and downloading data through 
mobile network in 2014 &2015. 
GSMA 
   
Mobile connectivity 
coverage 
Measures the weighted average of share of population covered by 2 G, 3 G 
and 4 G mobile data networks (normalized to range between 0 and 100). 
GSMA 
   
Telecom regulation Measures the regulatory quality of the telecom sector in terms of four 
major criteria: transparency, independence, resource availability, and 
enforcement capability of the regulator. The index is based on dozens of 





   
   
Macro-level factors   
   
Rule of Law A measure of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society 
WGI 
   
GDP per capita GDP per capita in purchasing power parity WDI 
   
GDP growth The rate of total GDP growth WDI 
   
Urbanization rate Percentage of population living in urban areas WDI 
   
Notes: Mobile Accounts is based on the second wave of the survey (2014) and Sending Money and Receiving Money are 
based on the first wave (2011). The variablestelecom regulation is based on data for 2011. The two variables measuring 
mobile connectivity are based on average values for the years 2014 & 2015. For the remainingvariables, averages are taken 














Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
      
Variables  Mean  S.D Min Max Obs 
      
Dependent variables      
Mobile accounts (%) 3.30 7.90 0.00 58.39 145 
Sending money (%) 3.10 7.58 0.00 60.48 146 
Receiving money (%) 4.47 9.58 0.00 66.65 146 
      
      
Demand factors      
Account at formal fin. Institution (%) 45.72 31.73 0.40 99.74 147 
ATM penetration 43.28 45.03 0.33 279.71 148 
Banking sector concentration 71.94 20.70 9.49 100.00 143 
      
      
Supply factors      
Unique mobile subscription rate 61.78 23.29 4.23 133.64 199 
Mobile connectivity (performance) 11.92 14.69 0.04 67.19 147 
Mobile connectivity (coverage) 62.18 27.29 8.88 99.60 147 
Telecom regulation 0.41 0.17 0.00 0.74 128 
      
      
Macro-level factors      
GDP per capita (PPP) 17,874 19,677 648 132,468 152 
GDP growth 3.90 2.82 -4.92 11.10 153 
Rule of Law -0.09 1.01 -2.42 1.98 157 
Urbanization (%) 58.22 22.85 8.81 100 155 
      
      
Notes: The average values for the dependent variables are calculated across all countries, including those in 



















Appendix  3: Correlation matrix 
                   
 Mobile inclusion variables Demand  Factors Supply Factors Macro-level Factors Region dummies 
 MMA SendM Receiv.M BankAc ATM Pen BankSC UMSr MCP MCC TSR GDPpc GDPg RL Urban Africa Asia Americas Middle East  
MMA 1.000                  
Send M 0.640 1.000                 
Receiv.M 0.597 0.980 1.000                
Bank Ac -0.292 -0.227 -0.266 1.000               
ATM Pen -0.319 -0.248 -0.279 0.708 1.000              
BankSC -0.079 -0.028 -0.026 0.051 -0.171 1.000             
UMSr -0.237 -0.116 -0.142 0.411 0.305 -0.045 1.000            
MCP -0.320 -0.272 -0.300 0.821 0.779 -0.053 0.270 1.000           
MCC -0.385 -0.300 -0.323 0.815 0.701 -0.091 0.525 0.780 1.000          
TSR -0.088 -0.070 -0.067 0.549 0.363 -0.008 0.237 0.466 0.473 1.000         
GDPpc -0.420 -0.209 -0.228 0.825 0.690 -0.078 0.644 0.729 0.872 0.535 1.000        
GDPg 0.376 0.189 0.176 -0.532 -0.481 -0.058 -0.300 -0.477 -0.527 -0.433 -0.553 1.000       
RL -0.271 -0.273 -0.308 0.850 0.623 0.040 0.374 0.838 0.772 0.605 0.772 -0.457 1.000      
Urban -0.396 -0.212 -0.220 0.566 0.567 -0.051 0.364 0.598 0.731 0.349 0.788 -0.381 0.583 1.000     
Africa 0.533 0.415 0.444 -0.558 -0.519 0.123 -0.462 -0.487 -0.681 -0.288 -0.683 0.407 -0.418 -0.560 1.000    
Asia -0.101 -0.076 -0.088 0.087 0.077 -0.009 -0.013 0.153 -0.006 -0.129 0.007 0.244 0.014 -0.075 -0.199 1.000   
Americas -0.098 -0.116 -0.095 -0.176 -0.016 -0.004 0.092 -0.198 -0.029 0.001 0.045 0.025 -0.221 0.158 -0.268 -0.278 1.000  
Middle East -0.086 -0.072 -0.082 -0.0001 0.047 0.019 -0.010 0.035 0.124 -0.131 0.140 0.040 0.017 0.237 -0.101 -0.105 -0.141 1.000 
                   
MMA: Mobile Money Accounts. Send M: Sending Money. Receiv M: Receiving Money. Bank Ac: Bank Accounts. ATM Pen: ATM Penetration. BankSC: Bank Sector Concentration. UMSr: Unique Mobile 
Subscription rate. MCP: Mobile Connectivity Performance. MCC: Mobile Connectivity Coverage. TSR: Telecom Sector Regulation. GDPpc: Gross Domestic Product per capita in PPP (in logs). GDPg: GDP growth. 
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